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RECENT CASES
APPEALABILITY OF DISTRICT COURT ORDERS
UNDER FEDERAL RULES
The Attorney General of the United States, as successor to the Alien Prop-
erty Custodian, brought suit in a federal district court against Deems Taylor,
as president of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers
(ASCAP). He sought the turnover of sums allegedly due from that society
to AKM, an Austrian organization of similar character. Henry M. Propper was
joined as defendant. Propper had been appointed temporary receiver of the
assets of AKM located in the state of New York. Before his appointment was
made permanent in July 1941,1 however, the President of the United States
issued an executive order prohibiting the transfer of Austrian property unless
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury.2 No authorization was ever given
by the Secretary with regard to the property in question. In September 1943,
the plaintiff's predecessor, Alien Property Custodian, vested in himself all
assets held by ASCAP for AKM. Upon refusal of ASCAP to turn over the sums
allegedly due, the present action was brought. The plaintiff claimed a right to
the turnover of the sums and, in addition, sought a declaration that Propper
had no interest in AKM's claim.
The district court granted summary judgment against Propper, denying his
right to the funds. Propper appealed from this order to the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the rest of the action remaining pending in the
district court against Taylor. The circuit court, Judge Frank dissenting, held
that the order was not final, and hence not appealable until the remainder of the
suit was disposed of in the district court. Clark v. Taylor.3
The United States Judicial Code limits the appellate jurisdiction of the cir-
cuit courts to "final" decisions.4 Seemingly simple, the rule presents consider-
able difficulty in application. By what criteria are the courts to determine
whether a particular disposition of issues is "final" and hence appealable?
Under common law practice in England this same rule prevailed-that only
a final judgment was appealable. The common law strictly defined finality and
would not allow an appeal until every matter arising in the controversy had
x On this date Propper brought suit in a New York state court against Taylor to recover the
same sums; the suit was still being adjudicated when the instant action was commenced.
2 3 Code Fed. Reg. 225 (i941 Supp.).
163 F. 2d 940 (C.C.A. 2d, 1947).
4 26 Stat. 828 (i89i), 28 U.S.C.A. § 225 (1927).
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been disposed of.s It is improbable that the common law interpretation of final-
ity worked any real hardship; the severe restrictions which were placed on join-
der of both parties and causes of action under common law practice limited
the subject matter of an action to a few interrelated issues so that little incon-
venience could result from delaying appeal until all issues had been determined.
Equity practice, however, allowed immediate appeal not only from final
judgments but from interlocutory decrees and orders as well.6 The more compli-
cated nature of many equity actions, in which divers matters had to be disposed
of in the same action, made such appeals necessary; for in many cases it was ob-
vious that to postpone appeal might well prejudice some of the parties.
In the United States the first Federal Judiciary Act7 limited appeal to "final"
decisions, making no distinction between law and equity. Realization of the
hardships which might result from applying the strict common-law interpre-
tation of finality to all cases led the courts in many cases to adopt a more
liberal interpretation. Appeals were permitted where the order appealed from
settled matters distinct from the general subject-matter of the litigation.' In
such decisions many rulings which under the English practice would have been
classified as mere orders or interlocutory decrees were held to be final.9 Where
the delay of an appeal caused no apparent hardship, however, and where the
issues disposed of were not entirely distinct from the general subject of litiga-
tion, the courts continued to deny appeal. Many courts in doing so failed to rec-
ognize the modification of finality made in the harsher cases and continued to
assert that to be appealable a judgment must be final "not only as to all the
parties, but as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of action
involved."" °
The confusion resulting from the varied interpretations of finality has been
greatly increased by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for the District
Courts, which allow extensive joinder of parties and causes.- Rule 54(b) per-
s Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 Yale L. J. 539, 546 (1932).
6 Ibid.
7 1 Stat. 72 (1789).
8 United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926); Williams v. Mor-
gan, iii U.S. 684, 699 (1884); see Arnold v. Guimarin Co., 263 U.S. 427 (1923). Exception
has also been made to the strict interpretation where it appeared that to deny appeal might
work irreparable injury to the party seeking appeal were it to appear later that the order was
erroneous. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
9 Congress also recognized that harsh results might ensue in many cases from a strict inter-
pretation of finality and amended the later Judicial Code by specifically excepting from the
finality rule certain types of orders with respect to injunctions, orders denying or granting re-
ceiverships, and certain orders in admiralty cases. 26 Stat. 828 (1891), 28 U.S.C.A. § 227
(1927); 56 Stat. 272 (1942), 28 U.S.C.A. 227 (1947 Supp.).
1 Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370 (i92o); In re Prindible, ii5 F. 2d 21 (C.C.A. 3d,
1940); Sheppy v. Stevens, 2o0 Fed. 946 (C.C.A. 2d, 1912).
"1 Rules 14, 18, 19(a), 20(a), 24(a), and 24(b), 28 U.S.C.A. foll. § 723 c (194i). These rules
replaced the Conformity Act, 17 Stat. 197 (1872), 28 U.S.C.A. 724 (934), under which district
court practice conformed to that of the state courts.
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mits the trial court "when more than one claim for relief is presented in an ac-
tion" to "enter a judgment disposing of such claim." The rule further provides:
"The judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed
of and the action shall proceed as to the remaining claims." These rules apply
only to procedure in the district courts and were not intended to affect appellate
jurisdiction."2 Yet it is obvious that the purpose of the rule, to minimize incon-
veniences arising in cases where numerous parties or causes are joined, would
be frustrated if appeal were not allowed from judgments of the type provided
for. The courts have realized that in order to effectuate the intent behind Rule
54, a liberal interpretation of the concept of finality must be adopted.3
Attempts to establish a satisfactory basis upon which to determine finality
have been notably unsuccessful. The difficulties arising out of the problem have
perhaps been best revealed in a series of decisions by the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit. In Collins v. Metro-coldwyn Pictures Corp.'4 the
court considered the appealability of an order which dismissed a claim re-
lating to an alleged infringement of a copyright and which left pending another
count of the complaint concerning alleged unfair competition in using the title
of the copyrighted material. The court held that, in view of the liberal joinder
provisions of the federal rules, the decision as to finality had to be determined
by the separability of the issues involved. Concluding that the two issues, al-
though involving the same facts to a certain extent, were nevertheless distinct
enough that each could be considered a separate "claim" under Rule 54 (b), the
court allowed the appeal. Judge Clark, concurring, elaborated on the decision.
While contending that a claim should constitute the unit for appeal, he pro-
posed that the definition of a claim should be flexible and should vary if desir-
able. Thus, a claim for purposes of appeal need not necessarily coincide with a
claim for other purposes. With reference to the claims in that case he asserted,
".... the evidence to support the first claim would to a considerable extent be
different from, and in addition to, that for the second claim, and there would
be little, if any, gain in forcing them always to be tried and adjudicated to-
gether."'s
The decision in the Collins case was severely criticized., 6 One writer17 argued
vigorously that the application of the theory adopted in that case would result
in an increased burden upon the appellate courts out of proportion to any
benefit derived by litigants. Judge Clark's theory that the concept of a "claim"
12 Audi Vision, Inc. v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co., 136 F. 2d 621 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943); 3 Moore, Federal
Practice 3155 (1938); Clark, Code Pleading 529 (2d ed., 1947).
"3Reeves v. Beardall, 316 U.S. 283 (1942); see Toomey v. Toomey, 149 F. 2d '9, 20 (App.
D.C., 1945).
'4 io6 F. 2d 83 (C.C.A. 2d, 1939).
IS Ibid., at 87.
6 3 Moore, Federal Practice 154-69 (1947 Supp.); 49 Yale L. J. 2476 (1940), noting Collins
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., io6 F. 2d 83 (C.C.A. 2d, x939).
'7 Moore, op. cit. supra note x6.
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should vary with the purpose was also censured on the ground that it would
make difficult the establishment of a body of precedent under the new rules.
While approving the so-called "pragmatic" theory that a claim should be de-
termined not by arbitrary rule, as under the old "legal-theory" method, but
through considerations of practical trial convenience,18 the writer nevertheless
insisted that an efficient and consistent application of this theory demands that
the concept of a "claim" be similarly defined for all purposes.
Subsequent to the Collins case, Judge Clark modified his position to conform
to these suggestions, and has since consistently asserted that a claim constitut-
ing an appealable judicial unit must include all matters arising out of a single
transaction or occurrence, or centered around the same "basic core" of facts.19
This is the same test which has generally been applied in testing joinder of
causes and of parties. The majority of the court, however, in a number of cases
continued to allow a more liberal interpretation for purposes of appeal and
adopted the view supported by Judge Frank in the instant case. Under this view
an order is final and appealable where proof of the dismissed claim requires sub-
stantial evidence different from that required for proof of the claims remaining
pending.20
In his dissenting opinion in the instant case Judge Frank denied that the
definition of a "claim" should be standardized for all purposes. He vigorously
objected to labeling such an approach "pragmatic," pointing out that a true
pragmatic approach judges a use by its results. He forcefully pointed out the
possible consequences of denying appeal in the instant case. The effect of the
ruling denying title to Propper will be to prevent his further participation in
the action. If, on appeal after the final determination of all the issues, it is found
that the original order against Propper was erroneous, the entire cause will be
remanded for a new trial with Propper as party plaintiff. If it should be de-
termined that as between Propper and the plaintiff, Propper is the sole legiti-
mate claimant, it will mean that the Attorney General will have conducted a
lengthy and costly trial only to find that he really has no interest whatever. In
addition, Propper may well find that he has been prejudiced by the proceedings
in the first trial.21
19 This theory is expounded in Clark, Code Pleading 137 (2d ed., 1947).
19 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial Corp., '54 F. 2d 814 (C.C.A. 2d,
1946), cert. den. 328 U.S. 859 (1946). Dissenting in Zarati S. S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp., 154
F. 2d 377, 381 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946); Zalkind v. Scheinman, 139 F. 2d 895, o06 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943);
Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. 2d 9, ii (C.C.A. 2d, 1942); Sidis v. F-R Pub-
lishing Corp., 113 F. 2d 8o6, 8ii (C.C.A. 2d, i94o). Concurring in Atwater v. North American
Coal Corp., iii F. 2d 125, 126 (C.C.A. 2d, 194o).
20Zarati S.S. Co. v. Park Bridge Corp., 154 F. 2d 377 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946); Zalkind v. Schein-
man, 139 F. d 895 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943); Musher Foundation v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F. 2d 9
(C.C.A. 2d, 1942); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., II 3 F. 2d 8o6 (C.C.A. 2d, 194o).
2 "judge Frank specifically refers to the possibility that important witnesses might be care-
lessly questioned by the plaintiff in the first trial and the answers used to impeach testimony on
a more careful questioning in the later trial.
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In further support of his argument that the appeal should have been allowed,
Judge Frank cited a number of cases, decided both before and after the adop-
tion of the federal rules, in which appeals were allowed under circumstances
analogous to the situation in the instant case.22 Analysis of these cases reveals
that all of the orders appealed from had one characteristic in common: They all
involved the complete disposition of the rights of one party to the action who
had an alleged beneficial interest in the subject-matter, not of a joint character
with the interests of the other parties. Such is the character of the order against
Propper in the instant case; for, although joined as defendant, he is in the same
position he would have been in had he interposed his own claim contesting the
plaintiff's right to bring the action. Numerous cases, many cited by the ma-
jority in support of its conclusion, have held that an order dismissing one of
several defendants jointly charged is not final.3 These cases seem to be inap-
propriate as precedents in view of the more closely analogous cases in which ap-
peals have been allowed. It is significant that in all of the cases denying appeal
from an order dismissing one defendant, the courts were careful to point out that
the liability alleged against the dismissed defendant was of a joint character. In
cases where the alleged liability was not joint, dismissal of one defendant was
held final.'4
The arguments of Judge Frank seem persuasive. An order which completely
eliminates a party claiming a beneficial interest in the subject-matter should be
considered final.25 It is true that the finality provision was designed to relieve
22Judge Frank classifies the cases as involving: i) An order dismissing the claim of a creditor
in a receivership, although the claims of other creditors remained undetermined. Hatch v.
Morosco Holding Co., x9 F. 2d 766 (C.C.A. 2d, 1927), aff'd 279 U.S. 218 (I927); City and
County of Denver v. Stenger, 295 Fed. 809 (C.C.A. 8th, 1924); American Brake Shoe & Foun-
dry Co. v. New York Rys. Co., 282 Fed. 523 (C.C.A. 2d, 1922). 2) An order that one party
to an interpleader has no claim against another, with the rights of other parties still unde-
cided. Bank of Taiwan v. Gorgas-Pierie Mfg. Co., 273 Fed. 66o (C.C.A. 3d, 1921). 3) An
order denying title of one of several claimants in a condemnation proceeding. State of Texas v.
Chuoke, 154F.2d i (C.C.A. 5th, 1946), cert. den. 32 9 U.S. 714 (1946); State of Texas v. Harris
County, 158 F. 2d 861 (C.C.A. 5th, 1946). 4) An order dismissing claims of only some of the
plaintiffs in a trust accounting action, where th6 divers plaintiffs' claims were not joint. Crut-
cher v. Joyce, 134 F. 2d 809 (C.C.A. ioth, 1943). 5) An order denying intervention when it is
a matter of right. Pipe Line Co. v. United States, 312 U.S. 502 (1941); Barrett v. Commercial
Credit Co., 296 Fed. 996 (App. D.C., 1924); Cathay Trust v. Brooks, 193 Fed. 973 (C.C.A.
9th, 1912); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 113 U.S. 545 (1885). Frank also relies upon Withenbury v.
United States, 5 Wall. (U.S.) 819 (1866).
23 Hohorst v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 148 U.S. 262 (1893); Photometric Products
Corp. v. Radtke, 157 F. 2d 849 (C.C.A. ad, x946); Porter v. American Distilling Co., 157 F. 2d
i13 (C.C.A. 2d, 1946); Hunteman v. New Orleans Public Service Inc., rig F. 2d 465 (C.C.A.
5 th, 7941).
24 Curtis v. Connly, 264 Fed. 65o (C.C.A. Ist, 192o), aff'd 257 U.S. 26o (1921).
2S Other courts have recognized such orders as final. Bankers' Trust Co. v. Missouri K. & T.
Ry. Co., 25i Fed. 789 (C.C.A. 8th, i918); Morrison v. Burnette, 154 Fed. 617 (C.C.A. 8th,
1907), appeal dismissed 212 U.S. 291 (i909). In Bankers' Trust Co. v. Missouri K. & T. Ry.
Co., supra, at 797, the court said, "A decision which completely deprives a party in a pending
proceeding who is not jointly liable with others of a substantial right or equity is a final de-
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the case-load of the appellate courts. But it is unwarranted to assume that it
was intended that the provision be construed so strictly as to result in the denial
of appeals from orders which might quite reasonably be deemed final, in cases
where such denials might jeopardize one party, cause unnecessary expense to
another, and greatly inconvenience both.
Finally, the argument that the "transaction" or "basic core" of facts test is
desirable in the interest of maintaining precedential simplicity is open to ques-
tion. It seems clear that the interests of the parties to the action should not be
sacrificed to this object. One of the most valid criticisms of procedural develop-
ment in the United States stems from the courts' inveterate tendency to look
for an inflexible rule-a magic formula with which to solve every problem. The
language of Rule 126 which states that the federal rules ".. . shall be construed
to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" in-
dicates that the framers of the rules hoped to eliminate this practice.
Judge Frank's position is buttressed by the fact that the questions involved
in the controversy between the plaintiff and Propper were in large measure dis-
tinct from the issues involved in the rest of the suit.2 Thus, the appellate court
even on an appeal of the entire case would be required to consider most of the
issues separately; separate appeals would, therefore, not greatly increase the
appellate court's burden.
In the light of the amendment to Rule 5 4 (b) which became effective since the
instant decision, there may be some question as to the significance of the case.
The amended rule, drafted primarily for the purpose of simplifying the problem
of appealability, provides that the district court may enter a final judgment on
less than all of the claims ".... only upon an express determination that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judg-
ment." It further provides that "In the absence of such determination and di-
rection, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudi-
cates less than all the claims shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims."
cision and reviewable... ." In interpreting the finality provision of the New York Civil Prac-
tice Act, the courts of that state have reached similar conclusions, and have held that an order
which effectively eliminates a party from an action is final as to that party even though it
might be considered interlocutory as to other parties. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. Ernst,
261 N.Y. 82, 85, 184 N.E. 502, 503 (I933); Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N.Y. 245, z39 N.E. 255
(1923); Brown v. Feek, 204 N.Y. 238, 97 N.E. 526 (1912).
"Rule 1, 28 U.S.C.A. fol. § 723 c (I941).
27 Judge Clark, in the majority opinion, states that the controversy between the plaintiff
and Propper involved two points: "(i) whether a temporary receiver under the controlling
New York law... takes title or has merely a right to possession, and (2) if only the latter
whether the Executive Order cited above prevented the devolution of title on the appointment
of Propper as permanent receiver." It is clear that as to the rest of the controversy (the ques-
tion as to the sums allegedly due from ASCAP to AKM), these points are only incidental, if
relevant at all.
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It has been suggested that this rule will reduce the determination of appeal-
ability to an objective test: whether the trial judge has chosen to label his ruling
"final."2s The exercise of some discretion on the part of the trial judge in this
matter is, of course, desirable. Also, the provision that all orders not designated
"final" shall be considered subject to revision will tend to minimize hardships
arising from errors. Nevertheless, a blank acceptance by the appellate courts
of such a test as the sole criterion for determining appealability would be un-
pardonable. It seems doubtful that the appellate courts would refuse to enter-
tain.appeals from orders of types previously held final and appealable, merely
because the trial judge failed to recognize and label the orders "final." This
would in reality be a system of discretionary appeal with the discretion resting
entirely in the hands of the trial court.2 9 It seems more likely that the amended
rule will have little effect upon appealability, and the problem of determining
finality in the difficult cases will continue to be the job of the appellate courts.
REVIEWABILITY OF SEC "ORDERS" UNDER THE
PUBLIC UTILITY HOLDING COMPANY ACT
The Pittsburgh Railways Company, though not a "public utility company"
within the meaning of Section 2(a) (5) of the Public Utility Holding Company
Act," was a "subsidiary ' 12 of a registered public utility holding company, the
Philadelphia Company, and was therefore subject to the requirements of the
Act, absent some exemption. On May io, 1938 the Pittsburgh Company filed a
voluntary petition for reorganization under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act3
in the District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Section ii(f)
of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, which requires reorganization plans
to be approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission prior to submission
of such plans to the court, 4 did not at that time apply to the Pittsburgh Com-
pany because the company was then exempt by virtue of Commission Rule
2S 56 Yale L. J. 141 (1946), noting Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Sylvania Industrial
Corp., 154 F. 2d 814 (C.C.A. 2d, r946), cert. den. 328 U.S. 859 (1946).
29 Judge Frank comments at length on this problem. Clark v. Taylor, 163 F. 2d 940, at
951 n. 12 (C.C.A. 2d, x947). In a concurring opinion in Audi Vision Inc. v. R.C.A. Mfg. Co.,
136 F. 2d 621 (C.C.A. 2d, x943), Judge Frank advocated statutory changes which would al-
low some type of discretionary appeal by the circuit courts. This suggestion is a result of a
belief that the time spent by appellate courts in determining whether a ruling is final could be
better spent in determining whether an appeal is desirable in the individual case, considering
both trial convenience and justice to the parties.
'§ 2(a)(5), 49 Stat. 804 (1935), x5 U.S.C.A. § 79 b(5) (1941).
2 § 2(a)(8), 49 Stat. 804 (1935), i5 U.S.C.A. § 79b(8) (1941).
3 48 Stat. 912 (i934), amended by 49 Stat. 664 (935) and 49 Stat. 965 (i935).
4 "... a reorganization plan for a registered holding company or any subsidiary company
thereof shall not become effective unless such plan shall have been approved by the [Securi-
ties and Exchange] Commission after opportunity for hearing prior to its submission to the
court." § ii(f), 49 Stat. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C.A. § 79k(f) (1941).
